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Abstract
Capacity expansion models in the power sector were among the ﬁrst applications of operations
research to the industry. The models lost some of their appeal at the inception of restructuring
even though they still oﬀer a lot of possibilities and are in many respect irreplaceable provided they
are adapted to the new environment. We introduce stochastic equilibrium versions of these models
that we believe provide a relevant context for looking at the current very risky market where the
power industry invests and operates. We then take up diﬀerent questions raised by the new environ-
ment. Some are due to developments of the industry like demand side management: an optimization
framework has diﬃculties accommodating them but the more general equilibrium paradigm oﬀers
additional possibilities. We then look at the insertion of risk related investment practices that devel-
oped with the new environment and may not be easy to accommodate in an optimization context.
Speciﬁcally we consider the use of plant speciﬁc discount rates that we derive by including stochas-
tic discount rates in the equilibrium model. Linear discount factors only price systematic risk. We
therefore complete the discussion by inserting diﬀerent risk functions (for diﬀerent agents) in order
to account for additional unpriced idiosyncratic risk in investments. These diﬀerent models can be
cast in a single mathematical representation but they do not have the same mathematical properties.
We illustrate the impact of these phenomena on a small but realistic example.
Key words: capacity adequacy, risk functions, stochastic equilibrium models, stochastic discount
factors
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Introduction
The restructuring of the electricity industry led to an explosion of literature transposing and extending
optimization models of short-term operations to equilibrium models of electricity markets with given
infrastructure. The optimal dispatch and its extension to the optimal power ﬂow are the reference opti-
mization paradigms at the origin of that literature. They cover energy and transmission and sometimes
encompass other services such as reserve. These models were instrumental in analyzing market design.
Variations of these models that encompass market power were also extensively developed to examine
market structure.
Capacity expansion models are as old as the optimal dispatch models but the transition from op-
timization to equilibrium models has not yet taken place. The early optimization models of capacity
expansion go back to the late ﬁfties when the industry was still regulated (Morlat and Bessière, 1971).
The problem was ﬁrst formulated as a linear program but further developments quickly followed suit and
extensions covered all types of optimization techniques. Capacity expansion, which was initially seen as
a true planning exercise was easily reinterpreted in terms of equilibrium in a competitive energy economy
in the early seventies after the ﬁrst energy crisis. The power industry of the seventies was still regulated
on a cost plus basis that largely protected it from risk. Deterministic models were thus satisfactory in the
situation of the time. Restructuring removed that protection at the same time that various new policies
and external events dramatically increased the risk surrounding the electricity sector. This emergence of
risk in the investment process strongly suggests to move the analysis from a deterministic to a stochas-
tic environment. The question is thus to transpose former optimization capacity expansion models to
stochastic equilibrium models. This extension is the subject of this paper.
The ﬁrst analysis of a capacity expansion problem in terms of a stochastic equilibrium capacity ex-
pansion model in the energy area is probably found in Haurie et al. (1988). The model deals with
gas developments and was formulated as an open loop Cournot equilibrium under demand uncertainty.
This model could be converted to an optimization model that was later used in Gürkan et al. (1999) to
illustrate the method of Sample Path since elaborated by several authors. Lin and Fukushima (2009)
recently reviewed diﬀerent models of stochastic equilibrium, among them the one used by Gürkan et al.
(1999) in their application of sample path to the investments in gas production. This model is stated as
a stochastic variational inequality problem; we adopt the closely related formulation of stochastic com-
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plementarity problems as the modeling paradigm of the investment problem throughout this paper.
Section 1 of the paper introduces a very simple and standard two-stage version of a stochastic op-
timization capacity expansion model as could have been constructed in the regulated environment. We
adopt a standard stochastic programming approach and present the model in terms of its ﬁrst and second
stages. We then immediately reformulate this problem in the stochastic equilibrium format that drives
the whole paper. Section 2 discusses the possibilities and limitations of stochastic equilibrium models to
account for idiosyncrasies of restructured electricity markets.
The rest of the paper analyses diﬀerent risk issues encountered in the investment process. The standard
approach in investment problems is to reﬂect risk in the discount rate. The discount rate is normally
regulated when the industry operates as a monopoly; this may have raised economic controversies but
did not create modeling diﬃculties as the discount rate is just a single parameter of the model. The
problem is quite diﬀerent in a world where project ﬁnance drives the capacity expansion process and
requires that plants are evaluated on the basis of diﬀerent discount rates. The CAPM and the APT
are the reference theories for ﬁnding these discount rates. Expositions of these theories can be found
in any textbook of corporate ﬁnance and we take them for granted. The adoption of a project ﬁnance
approach therefore requires the stochastic equilibrium model to accommodate plant speciﬁc discount
rates while maintaining the interpretation of a competitive economy that is the justiﬁcation of the model.
A ﬁrst treatment of the question is given in Section 3 leading to a ﬁxed point formulation. Section 4
adopts an alternative, probably more rigorous but also less usual representation of risk. Starting again
from a CAPM based formulation it assumes that the diﬀerent risks aﬀecting plants can be taken care
of by modifying the payoﬀ of the diﬀerent plants using a linear stochastic discount rate. Discounting
is then conducted at the risk free rate but with risk adjusted cash ﬂows computed with CAPM based
stochastic discount rates. Section 5 considers an alternative version of the risk neutral discounting where
the adjustment to the cash ﬂow is derived from risk functions. Risk functions were initially developed by
Artzner et al. (1999) and have been recently cast in an optimization context (see the book by Shapiro
et al., 2009 for a comprehensive treatment). We extend this view to an equilibrium context to construct
alternative adjustments of the cash ﬂows of the plants. We provide a simpliﬁed but realistic illustration
of these notions in Section 6. Conclusion summarizes the paper. In order to simplify the presentation
the discussion is entirely conducted on a two or three stages models depending of our needs.
3
1 The basic capacity expansion model
1.1 The optimization model
Consider a two-stage set up where one invests in a mix of new technologies in stage 0 and operates them
in stage 1. The objective is to satisfy a time segmented, price insensitive demand so as to minimize
total (annual in this simple case) cost. The ﬁrst versions of these models go back to the late ﬁfties.
They were initially formulated as linear programs and later expanded to take advantage of essentially all
optimization techniques. We introduce these models as follows.
Consider a set of capacity types K and a load duration curve decomposed in diﬀerent time segments
L as depicted in Figure 1. The left ﬁgure gives a general decomposition and characterizes each time
segment by its duration τ(`) and demand level d(`). The right ﬁgure depicts the particular case of a
decomposition into peak and oﬀ peak segments.
τ(l)
d(l)
off peak
peak
Figure 1: Decomposition of the load duration curve
Assume in order to simplify the presentation that there is no existing capacity. We introduce the fol-
lowing notation: x(k) is the investment in capacity (in MW) of technology k ∈ K in the period; this
capacity is operated at level y(k, `) (in MW) in time segment ` of duration τ(`) (in hours) when demand
level is d(`) (in MW).
∑
` τ(`) = 8760 is the number of hours in a year. The annual investment cost of
technology k is I(k) (in ⊂=/MW) and its (constant) marginal operating cost is c(k) (in ⊂=/Mwh). PC is
the Value of Lost load (VOLL), that is the economic value (in ⊂=/Mwh) of unsatisﬁed electricity demand.
The notion has been around since several decades but has so far escaped any precise evaluation. VOLL is
4
thus often taken as a conventional value ranging between 1000 and 10 000 ⊂=/Mwh. PC can alternatively
be interpreted as a price cap, that is an upper bound on the electricity price set by the Regulator (ﬁgures
ranging between 300 and 3000 ⊂=/Mwh are then found in practice); z(`) is the unsatisﬁed demand in time
segment ` (in MW).
Adopting the standard two stage approach of stochastic programming, we successively write the second
and ﬁrst stage optimization problems (dual variables are stated at the right of the equations) as follows.
The (short term) operations problem is stated as the following short term cost minimization problem
Q(x) ≡ min
y,z
∑
`∈L
τ(`)
[∑
k∈K
c(k) y(k, `) + PC z(`)
]
(1)
s.t.
0 ≤ x(k)− y(k, `) τ(`)µ(k, `) (2)
0 ≤
∑
k∈K
y(k, `) + z(`)− d(`) τ(`)pi(`) (3)
0 ≤ y(k, `). (4)
The (long term) investment problem is stated as a long term cost minimization problem
min
x≥0
∑
k∈K
I(k)x(k) +Q(x). (5)
In accordance with the units used for deﬁning the parameters and primal variables, µ(k, `) and pi(`) are
in ⊂=/Mw. It is more convenient to refer to them as ⊂=/Mwh.
1.2 The equilibrium version of the optimization model
The conversion of the optimization model to an equilibrium model is obtained by writing duality relations.
The KKT conditions of the operations problem are stated as
0 ≤ x(k)− y(k, `) ⊥ µ(k, `) ≥ 0 (6)
0 ≤
∑
k∈K
y(k, `) + z(`)− d(`) ⊥ pi(`) ≥ 0 (7)
0 ≤ c(k) + µ(k, `)− pi(`) ⊥ y(k, `) ≥ 0 (8)
0 ≤ PC − pi(`) ⊥ z(`) ≥ 0. (9)
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Those of the investment problem are
0 ≤ I(k)−
∑
`∈L
τ(`)µ(k, `) ⊥ x(k) ≥ 0. (10)
Complementarity formulations of capacity expansion models have been used by Gürkan et al. (2009)
to examine diﬀerent investment incentive policies in restructured markets. Our focus in this paper is
diﬀerent; we assume a single investment incentive mechanism throughout the paper (as embedded in the
model (6) to (10) and usually referred to as energy only"); we then concentrate on the investment cost
I(k) that we examine through diﬀerent theories of corporate ﬁnance.
Relations (6) to (10) can easily be interpreted in terms of a perfect competition equilibrium. For the
sake of brevity, we present this discussion in Appendix 1 and only report here the economic interpretation
of the dual variables that play a key role in the rest of the discussion. Most important for our purpose,
µ(k, `) is the hourly marginal value of capacity k in time segment `. It is zero if the capacity is not fully
utilized in that time segment; it is positive and τ(`)µ(k, `) measures the hourly marginal decrease of the
operating cost of the system in time segment ` if one adds a unit of capacity k. The hourly marginal
generation cost in time segment ` is measured by pi(`). It is the sum of the operating cost c(k, `) and of
the hourly marginal value µ(k, `) of capacity k when it is operating. The price pi(`) is set to PC when
load is curtailed.
The discussion developed in this paper focuses on the investment criterion (10). Its interpretation is
that one invests in technology k when the investment cost I(k) is equal to the weighted (by τ(`)) sum
of the hourly marginal values of the capacity µ(k, `) computed over all time segments. We refer to this
weighted sum
∑
` τ(`)µ(k, `) as the gross margin of plant k and note it in abridged form µ(k). µ(K) is the
vector of the µ(k) for k ∈ K. One does not invest in technology k when the gross margin is insuﬃcient to
cover I(k). Because of the interactions between the operation and investment stages, µ(K) is an element
of the subdiﬀerential ∂xQ(x) of the operating cost with respect to x (see Appendix 2.1). This is a point
to set mapping from R|K|+ into R
|K|
+ (Appendix 2.2). We can then restate µ(k, `) as µ(x; k, `) (and µ(k)
as µ(x; k)) in the above investment relation in order to express the dependence of the marginal value of
capacity on the amount of capacity. The investment criterion is then written as
0 ≤ I(k)−
∑
`∈L
τ(`)µ(x, k, `) ⊥ x(k) ≥ 0 (11)
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or in abridged form after writing µ(x, k) =
∑
`∈L
τ(`), µ(x, k, `) and collecting these expressions (11) for
all k
0 ≤ I(K)− µ(x,K) ⊥ x(K) ≥ 0. (12)
This complementarity relation summarizes the whole capacity investment model: assuming that one
knows the mapping µ(x;K) for a particular problem, the capacity expansion problem is entirely summa-
rized in (12). The properties of the mapping µ(x,K) intervening in this model have important implications
on the existence and unicity of equilibria. Because of the expository nature of this work, we only brieﬂy
mention these properties in passing and leave their detailed analysis for a further paper. We now extend
this model to the stochastic case.
1.3 Introducing risk
The introduction of risk factors generalizes the above model to a stochastic environment. Fuel costs c(k)
and demand levels d(`) are standard risk factors that immediately come to mind. Regulatory risks are
new risks that take a prominent role in the current environment of the ﬁrm. They originate both from
the regulation of the power sector and from related domains like environmental regulation. The cost PC,
when interpreted as a price cap set by the Regulator is an illustration of regulatory risk: the Regulator
sets the price during curtailment. We make no assumption on the dependence or independence of these
risk factors. Let ω denote a scenario and Ω be the set of these scenarios. We note c(k, ω), d(`, ω), PC(ω)
as the exogenous fuel cost, demand and PC scenario. We also note y(k, `, ω), µ(k, ω), pi(`, ω) as the
endogenous realisation of the primal and dual variables of the operation model in that scenario. The
formulation of the optimization and complementarity problems extends to this more general problem
by assuming risk neutral generators (investors) that see the same scenarios and share the same beliefs
(probability p(ω)) about their occurrence. This is stated as follows.
1.3.1 The stochastic capacity expansion optimization model
The second stage operations model in scenario ω becomes,
Q(x;ω) ≡ min
y,z
∑
`∈L
τ(`)
[∑
k∈K
c(k;ω) y(k; `, ω) + PC(ω) z(`, ω)
]
(13)
s.t.
0 ≤ x(k)− y(k; `, ω) τ(`)µ(k; `, ω) (14)
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0 ≤
∑
k∈K
y(k; `, ω) + z(`, ω)− d(`, ω) τ(`)pi(`, ω) (15)
0 ≤ y(k; `, ω). (16)
The ﬁrst stage investment part of the model is stated as
min
x≥0
∑
k∈K
I(k)x(k) + EpQ(x;ω). (17)
where Ep denotes the expectation under the p measure. For notational convenience, we sometimes also
refer to EpQ(x, ω) as Q(x).
1.3.2 The stochastic capacity expansion equilibrium model
As before, the equilibrium model is obtained by writing the KKT conditions of the second and ﬁrst stage
problems respectively. For the second stage problem, we have
0 ≤ x(k)− y(k; `, ω) ⊥ µ(k; `, ω) ≥ 0 (18)
0 ≤
∑
k∈K
y(k; `, ω) + z(`, ω)− d(`, ω) ⊥ pi(`, ω) ≥ 0 (19)
0 ≤ c(k;ω) + µ(k; `, ω)− pi(`, ω) ⊥ y(k; `, ω) ≥ 0 (20)
0 ≤ PC(ω)− pi(`, ω) ⊥ z(`, ω) ≥ 0 (21)
The ﬁrst stage KKT conditions are stated as:
0 ≤ I(k)− Ep
∑
`∈L
τ(`)µ(k; `, ω) ⊥ x(k) ≥ 0 (22)
or after explicitly introducing the dependence of µ(k; `, ω) on x, and rewriting µ(x, k, ω) =∑
`∈L
τ(`)µ(x; k, `, ω) and collecting all k investment criteria
0 ≤ I(K)− Ep µ(x,K, ω) ⊥ x(K) ≥ 0. (23)
Again we sometimes also refer to µ(x, k) = Ep µ(x, k, ω) for the sake of notational convenience. Recall
that µ(x;K) is the |K| dimensional mapping formed by the µ(x; k). We refer to models of this type
(relations (18) to (22) or relation (23)) as the Fixed Demand Model (FDM) .
1.4 Focusing on the investment model
The complementarity condition (23) summarizes the whole equilibrium description of capacity expansion
in the stochastic case. It takes the form of a stochastic complementarity problem and could easily
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be extended to a stochastic variational inequality if there were constraints on the x variables. While
formulation (23) does not tell us anything that we could not have learned from the stochastic optimization
model, it allows one to state questions that remain relevant when formulating an equilibrium model
without being able to invoke an optimization problem to start with. The fundamental convexity property
that underlies a signiﬁcant part of the theory of stochastic programming carries through here by noting
that −µ(x;K, `) and hence −µ(x;K) is monotone in x (see Appendix 3 for the deﬁnition of a monotone
operator). The complementarity condition (23) resembles the stochastic equilibrium model introduced
in Gürkan et al. (1999). Note however that the mapping −µ(x;K) is upper semi-continous and not
continuous as in Gürkan et al. and in the more usual complementarity theory (see Appendix 2.2). The
next section discusses variations of this model.
2 Alternative equilibrium models of capacity expansion
2.1 Welfare maximization equilibrium models
We noted that -µ(x;K) is monotone in x but not continuous. This creates technical diﬃculties if one
wants to stick to the complementarity or variational inequality formulations, which are the more natural
way to state equilibrium problems. The following introduces a variant of the model that leads to a con-
tinuous mapping -µ(x;K) while at the same time being more in line with standard economic thinking.
The common assumption in economic theory is to suppose that demand varies with prices. Even then,
the common wisdom in electricity modelling is to admit that the demand of electricity is price insensitive
in the short run, as is eﬀectively the case in the short run operations model (18) to( 21). This assumption
is then commonly but unduly extended to the long run and embedded in the investment model. There
are at least two reasons to question that extension. One is that demand, even if non price sensitive today
in the short run, is clearly price sensitive in the long run, which is the natural horizon for a capacity ex-
pansion model. Large industrial consumers will not keep their demand unchanged in the long run if they
anticipate high electricity prices. Similarly high electricity prices will induce conservation in household
and tertiary and hence reduction of demand. The second reason is that the increasing interest for de-
mand side management and the development of new technologies of the smart grid type will progressively
introduce a true price response in the short run. Taking stock of these two reasons we modify the above
model to encompass a demand function. We start with the optimization problem that we immediately
state in a stochastic formulation.
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Let d(p(`), `, ω) be the demand function in time segment `, and scenario ω. Both the demand and the
price in time segment ` and scenario ω are one dimensional. Assuming, as in standard economics, that
d(`, ω) is monotonically decreasing with p(`, ω), the function d(p(`), `, ω) can be inverted into p(d(`), `, ω)
for each time segment ` and scenario ω. We do not know much today about this demand function with
several studies giving widely diverging results (e.g., Newbery, 2003 quotes a long run price elasticity of
-1). It thus makes sense to embed the uncertainty on the demand function in the model, which justiﬁes
our introducing a dependence on ω in d(p(`), `, ω) and p(d(`), `, ω).
The stochastic optimization model of the short term welfare can then be stated as follows (in min-
imisation form) where MSTW stands for Minus Short Term Welfare:
MSTW (x, ω) ≡ min
y
∑
`∈L
τ(`)
[∑
k∈K
c(k, ω) y(k, `, ω)−
∫ d(`,ω)
0
p(ξ, `, ω)dξ
]
(24)
s.t.
0 ≤ x(k)− y(k, `, ω) τ(`)µ(k, `) (25)
0 ≤
∑
k∈K
y(k, `, ω)− d(`, ω) τ(`)pi(`) (26)
0 ≤ y(k, `, ω). (27)
The long term welfare optimisation is similarly stated (in minimisation form) as
min
x≥0
∑
k∈K
I(k)x(k) + EpMSTW (x, ω). (28)
The equilibrium model is derived by writing the KKT conditions of that problem. We obtain for the
short run market
0 ≤ x(k)− y(k, `, ω) ⊥ µ(k, `, ω) ≥ 0 (29)
0 ≤
∑
k∈K
y(k, `, ω)− d(`, ω) ⊥ pi(`, ω) ≥ 0 (30)
0 ≤ c(k, ω) + µ(k, `, ω)− pi(`, ω) ⊥ y(k, `, ω) ≥ 0 (31)
0 ≤ pi(`, ω)− p(d(`), `, ω) ⊥ d(`, ω) ≥ 0 (32)
while the investment criterion becomes
0 ≤ I(k)− Ep
[∑
`∈L
τ(`)µ(k, `, ω)
]
⊥ x(k) ≥ 0. (33)
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or after introducing the dependence of µ(k, `, ω) on x and deﬁning µ(x, k, ω) =
∑
`
τ(`)µ(x, k, `, ω) and
assembling these relations for all k
0 ≤ I(K)− Ep µ(x,K, ω) ⊥ x(K) ≥ 0. (34)
The main diﬀerence between (34) and (23) is in the properties of the mapping µ which is here a monotone
continuous point to point mapping of the capacity x (see Appendix 2.3). We refer to this model (relations
(29) to (32) and (34)) as the Variable Demand Model (VDM).
2.2 Optimization problems that do not extend to equilibrium models
The above short run optimisation problems are of the convex type and hence have a well behave dual.
This allows one to write KKT conditions that can easily be interpreted in terms of perfect competition
equilibrium. Not all capacity expansion optimization models have a convex second stage optimization
problem. This is in particular the case when the second stage involves unit commitment features (start
up and shutdown of machines, minimum down and up time constraints). Considerable eﬀort has been
devoted to the analysis of these questions in short term and hedging models (e.g. Eichhorn et al., 2010,
Kuhn and Schultz, 2009, and Römisch and Vigerske, 2010). We are not aware of any attempt to include
them in capacity expansion models. Second stage optimization models that include unit commitment
features cannot be converted into complementarity problems and hence in complementarity models of
equilibrium. Convexiﬁcation of these eﬀects such as elaborated in Gribik et al. (2007) could however
lead to approximate equilibrium models.
2.3 Equilibrium models that do not derive from optimization problems
Leaving aside second stage optimisation problems that cannot be exactly converted into equilibrium mod-
els, we now consider equilibrium problems that cannot be obtained from KKT conditions of optimisation
problems. These abound in the electricity restructuring because of the diversity of organisations of the
electricity market and its numerous submarkets (e.g., transmission, reserve of diﬀerent quality). Diﬀerent
arrangements of other related markets such as the EU-ETS also easily lead to short run equilibrium
models that do not derive from optimization (e.g. Ehrenmann and Smeers, 2010). In the interest of
space we do not engage into that discussion here but simply illustrate our point by presenting an ex-
tension of the welfare maximisation problem described by equations (29) to (33) to a model where the
demand model cannot be integrated into a willingness to pay function. This problem originates in the
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PIES model (Ahn and Hogan, 1982) that was built by combining a large linear programming model and
various heterogenous demand models that could not be integrated into a utility function (see Harker and
Pang, 1990, for the integrability property).
This variant of the equilibrium model can be stated as follows. Let D(ω) = (d(`, ω), ` ∈ L) and
P (ω) = (p(`, ω), ` ∈ L) denote the vectors of demand and price in the diﬀerent time segments. Smart
grid technologies aim, among other goals, at introducing storage possibilities across the diﬀerent time
segments. In other words, demand d(`, ω) in time segment `, no longer depends on the sole price p(`, ω)
in time segment `, but on the whole price vector P (ω). The objective is to create at the demand side,
storage possibilities that are so diﬃcult to achieve at the generation side. Taking stock of that extension,
we write the demand model as
D(P, ω) ≡ {d(P, `, ω), ` ∈ L}.
Assuming that the vector function D(P, ω) can be inverted into a system P (D,ω)
P (D,ω) ≡ {p(D, `, ω), ` ∈ L}
but that P (D,ω) cannot be integrated into a willingness to pay function (equivalently P (D,ω) is not a
gradient function) we replace the short run welfare maximization problem by the following equilibrium
conditions.
0 ≤ x(k)− y(k, `, ω) ⊥ µ(k, `, ω) ≥ 0 (35)
0 ≤
∑
k∈K
y(k, `, ω)− d(`, ω) ⊥ pi(`, ω) ≥ 0 (36)
0 ≤ c(k, ω) + µ(k, `, ω)− pi(`, ω) ⊥ y(k, `, ω) ≥ 0 (37)
0 ≤ pi(`, ω)− p(D, `, ω) ⊥ d(`, ω) ≥ 0 (38)
These conditions cannot be obtained as KKT conditions of a welfare maximization problem. Still the
investment criterion remains
0 ≤ I(K)− Ep
[∑
`∈L
τ(`)µ(K, `, ω)
]
⊥ x(K) ≥ 0. (39)
Applying a well known integrability theorem (e.g. Theorem 1.3.1 in Facchinei and Pang, 2003), one can
show that the model would have been a stochastic optimization problem if the inverted demand system
P (D,ω) were integrable, that is, if it satisﬁed
∂p(D, `, ω)
∂d(`′, ω)
=
∂p(D, `′, ω)
∂d(`, ω)
for all `, `′,
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This condition was not satisﬁed in the PIES model (Ahn and Hogan, 1982); it will generally not be
satisﬁed in multiperiod investments models where the demand models is adapted (demand in some
period depends on past prices but not on future prices (e.g. Wu and Fuller, 1996) and hence does not
derive from a multiperiod willingness to pay function. Even in single period investment model the demand
shifting properties created by smart grids will violate this integrability property. But even though we
cannot rely on an optimization model, the investment problem retains the standard complementarity
form (39) or with the usual short cut
0 ≤ I(K)− µ(x;K) ⊥ x(K) ≥ 0. (40)
Note that any demand system P (D,ω) that can be written as a gradient function satisﬁes the integrability
property. This is in particular the case of multiperiod perfect foresight demand systems. Problem (40)
can then be reformulated as an optimization model. The mapping µ(x;K) is continuous in x. Its
monotonicity properties depend on the demand system. We do not discuss the question here (see Aghassi
et al., 2006 for a discussion of convexity of asymmetric variational inequality problems).
3 Project ﬁnance and asset speciﬁc discounting rates
Investments in a risky environment require risk adjusted discount factors. Speciﬁcally the two-stage
investment model (1) to (5) of section 1.1 requires converting the total plant investment cost I(k) into
the annual investment cost I(k). This is commonly done, using the standard formula
I(k)
T∑
t=1
1
(1 + r(k))t
= I(k) (in ⊂=/Mw) (41)
where T is the assumed life of the plant and r(k) is a discount rate. This annual investment cost can be
turned into an hourly capacity cost in ⊂=/Mwh by dividing by 8760 (the number of hours in a year).
The tradition in the regulated industry is to apply a single discount rate r to all equipment in capacity
expansion models of the type described by relations ((1) to (5)). This discount rate reﬂects the risk expo-
sure of the company and is meant to provide the adequate remuneration of investors and lenders. In order
to simplify the discussion we assume a full equity ﬁnancing (no debt) which means that r represents the
cost of equity. Cost plus regulation limited the risk bearing on the monopoly company and the Regulator
accordingly decided the discount rate and the allowed return on capital of the company. The long life
of the plants, the slowly evolving nature of the portfolio and the relatively surprise free evolution of the
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economy in a still recent past further contributed to reduce risk.
The restructuring of the sector and the introduction of a project ﬁnance approach in investment
changed this practice. A generation unit is valued on the basis of its own merit, which in particular
means on the basis of its own risk exposure. The plant thus has its own risk adjusted discount factor.
A common practice (Graham and Harvey, 2001) is to derive these risk factors through a CAPM based
approach, applied this time to each plant separately. The CAPM theory of ﬁnancial assets is extensively
discussed in any textbook of corporate ﬁnance; in contrast its application to physical assets is much less
elaborated. A comprehensive treatment and appropriate references can be found in Armitage (2005),
which points to several drawbacks of the use of the CAPM for project evaluation. Notwithstanding
the reservations against the CAPM and its standard applications to physical assets found in the liter-
ature, we conduct the discussion in these terms because of the wide application of the method in practice.
The insertion of the project ﬁnance view in capacity expansion models raises diﬀerent questions.
Some are due to the multiperiod discounting of the cash ﬂows. For the sake of brevity and in order to
stick to our two stage set up, we do not discuss them here and refer the reader to a companion paper
(Ehrenmann and Smeers (2009)). Other questions already arise in the two stage context adopted in this
paper. Suppose that I(k) is determined from the total investment cost I(k) of equipment k using formula
(41). Both the Fixed Demand (FDM: relation: (23)) or Variable Demand models (VDM: relation (34))
can be formally implemented by assuming exogenously determined r(k). This does not pose particular
computational diﬃculty in a two-stage model. The question discussed below is whether it is a consistent
treatment of risk.
We ﬁrst note that the short term equilibrium models (relations (18) to (21) for FDM and relations
(29) to (32) for VDM) are unaﬀected by the choice of the discount rate. Each machine only appears in
these short term models through its capacity and variable cost; the market therefore ﬁnds the short term
equilibrium irrespectively of the investment cost of these units. Things are diﬀerent in the investment
model ((23) for FDM and (32) for VDM). The analogy (see Armitage (2005), chapter 6, for a treatment
that goes beyond the analogy) between ﬁnancial and physical assets that underlies the application of
the CAPM to physical assets suggests the following reasoning. A unitary investment in plant k buys a
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capacity 1
I(k)
, a unit capacity in that plant generates a payoﬀ
∑
`
τ(`)[pi(`, ω)− c(k, `, ω)]y(k, `, ω). (42)
Combining the two relations, the net return on investment in scenario ω of a unit investment in plant k
can be written as
R(k, ω) =
∑
`
τ(`)[pi(`, ω)− c(k, `, ω)] y(k, `, ω)
I(k)
. (43)
Note that R(k, ω) and hence Ep[R(k, ω)] are results of the model established with given r(k). The ques-
tion is whether the returns R(k, ω) are compatible with the discount rate r(k) used for the equipment
or in other words whether r(k) = Ep[R(k, ω)] − 1. This requires explicitly invoking the underlying risk
theory, which in this section is the usual CAPM.
In order to do so we expand the deﬁnition of the scenarios by explicitly introducing the market M(ω)
and the return on the market R(M,ω) in scenario ω. These are additional data that need to be part of the
scenarios. Limiting the discussion to the ﬁxed demand model for the sake of brevity, scenario ω therefore
encompasses assumptions on c(k, ω), d(`, ω), PC(ω), M(ω) and R(M,ω). In order to be consistent with
the CAPM, r(k) should be consistent with the return R(k, ω) accruing from an investment in plant k.
This implies imposing the standard CAPM formula
r(k) = rf +
cov(R(k, ω), R(M,ω))
σ2[R(M,ω)]
Ep[R(M,ω)−Rf ] (44)
where Rf is the gross risk free rate (1+ the net risk free rate rf ) . The investment models (23)(for FDM)
or (34)(for VDM) in a CAPM based environment are then completed by adding the two relations
I(k)
T∑
t=1
1
(1 + r(k))t
= I(k) (in ⊂=/Mw) (45)
where r(k) is satisﬁes
r(k) = rf +
cov(R(k, ω)R(M,ω))
σ2[R(M,ω)]
Ep[R(M,ω)−Rf ]. (46)
One can immediately see that the addition of these relations destroys the two stage decomposition
of the model by introducing a strong coupling between these stages. It also destroys any monotonicity
property. The model can however still be posed as a ﬁxed point problem of r(K).
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4 Linear stochastic discount factors
The above approach requires solving a ﬁxed point problem (a circularity" problem in Armitage, 2005)
in order to ﬁnd the r(k)) compatible with the endogenous risk exposure of the diﬀerent plants. This
is cumbersome. An alternative much lighter method introduced in Fama (1997) is to resort to CAPM
based deterministic equivalents of stochastic cash ﬂows. We present this approach in the context of the
more general theory of linear stochastic discount factors that embeds not only the CAPM but also the
less used Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) and the multitemporal consumer theory. As before we assume
an expanded deﬁnition of scenarios that includes the market M(ω). We refer the reader to Cochrane
(2005) or Armitage (2005) for discussions of linear stochastic discount rates and restrict ourselves to the
elements of the theory necessary for constructing the stochastic equilibrium models.
4.1 A primer on linear stochastic discount factors
Consider a two stage set up where one wants to assess in time 0 a cash ﬂow X(ω) accruing in time 1.
A stochastic discount factor(or price kernel or state price vector) is a vector m(ω) such that the value
of this cash ﬂow in stage 0 is equal to Ep[m(ω) ×X(ω)]. Both economic and ﬁnance oﬀer theories that
allow one to construct the price kernel m(ω). Speciﬁcally (e.g. see Cochrane, 2005) the CAPM leads to
state a stochastic discount rate of the form
m(ω) = a− b×R(M,ω)
where a and b are determined to satisfy
Ep[m(ω) | ω] = 1
Rf
(m(ω) prices the risk free asset 1(ω) that redeems 1 in all scenarios ω), and
Ep[m(ω)×R(M,ω)] = 1
Rf
(m(ω) prices the market M(ω)). Because R(M,ω) and Rf are data of the problem, a and b and hence
the stochastic discount factor are also data to the problem.
The pricing kernel m(ω) and the payoﬀ X(ω) do not necessarily span the same space. Let X =
Xm + X⊥m be a decomposition of the space of payoﬀs where Xm is the subspace spanned by m(ω)
(which has a nonzero covariance with m(ω)) and X⊥m the subspace orthogonal to Xm with respect to
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the scalar product Ep(x × y). In standard ﬁnancial language, Xm(ω) is the systematic risk embedded
in the payoﬀ X(ω) (the risk priced by m(ω) or the market in CAPM parlance) and X⊥m(ω) is the
idiosyncratic component of X(ω), that is the component that is priced to zero by m(ω).
We ﬁrst explain that resorting to linear discount rates allows one to conduct all discounting at the
risk free rate and therefore eliminates the need for ﬁnding a risk adjusted discount rate that reﬂects the
risk exposure of the plants (in particular in order to ﬁnd the annual value I(k)). We thus bypass the
need to solve a ﬁxed point problem. In order to conduct the discussion with suﬃcient generality, we
depart from the two stage paradigm and consider a three stage set up where one invests in period 0 and
collects random payoﬀs X1(ω1) and X2(ω1, ω2) in periods 1 and 2. The stochastic discounting approach
extends as follows. Let m1(ω1) and m2(ω2|ω1) be the stochastic and conditional stochastic discount
factors in stages 1 and 2 respectively. Let also p1(ω1) and p2(ω2|ω1) be the probabilities and conditional
probabilities of the diﬀerent states of the world in stages 1 and 2 respectively. Proceeding recursively
from stage 2 to 0, the global value in 0 of the two cash ﬂows is equal to
Ep1 [m
1(ω1)× [X1(ω1) + Ep2(|ω1)[m2(ω2|ω1)×X2(ω2|ω1))]].
We now show how this expression can be restated in a form that only involves the risk free discount factor.
The value in stage 1 of payoﬀ X2(ω2|ω1) conditional on ω1 can be written
Ep2(|ω1)[m2(ω2|ω1)X2(ω2|ω1)]
= 1
Rf
[
Ep2(|ω1)X
2(ω2|ω1) +Rfcov[m2(ω2|ω1), X2(ω2|ω1)]
]
= 1
Rf
X˜2(ω1)
where X˜2(ω1) is a deterministic equivalent in period 1 of the conditional cash ﬂow X2(ω2|ω1). The payoﬀ
accruing in stage 1 and to be assessed in stage 0 is thus
X1(ω1) +
1
Rf
X˜2(ω1).
Conducting the same reasoning, the valuation in stage 0 of this random cash ﬂow in stage 1 can be
written as
1
Rf
X˜1,2.
One can now restate these manipulations by expliciting the diﬀerent contributions accruing in stages 1
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and 2. Speciﬁcally
X˜2(ω1) = Ep2(|ω1)X
2(ω2 | ω1) +Rfcov[m2(ω2 | ω1), X2(ω2 | ω1)]
is the deterministic equivalent in stage 2 of the conditional random cash ﬂow X2(ω2 | ω1). Similarly
X˜1(ω1) = Ep1X
1(ω1) +R
f cov[m1(ω1), X
1(ω1)]
is the deterministic equivalent in stage 1 (before discounting to 0 by 1
Rf
) of the random cash ﬂow X1(ω).
One observes that all discounting can be conducted at the risk free rate using CAPM based determin-
istic equivalent cash ﬂow (see Armitage, 2005 for a detailed treatment). This justiﬁes conducting all
the valuations at the risk free rate by working with risk adjusted cash ﬂows. The approach bypasses
the circularity" of the standard discounting practice, here presented through a ﬁxed point model. This
is the approach taken in the next subsection. It avoids resorting to the annoying ﬁxed point problem
and is always compatible with the CAPM theory. In contrast the more standard discounting approach
suﬀers from other circularity aspects arising when projects are also partially ﬁnanced by debt (Fama,
1997). Last we shall see that the certainty equivalent cash ﬂow oﬀers a good chance (but no guarantee)
of retaining the monotonicity properties of µ(x; k).
The models of Sections 4.1 and 3 are equivalent in this two-stage context, provided one makes the
assumption that the annual investment cost can be obtained by a single r(k) (unconditional CAPM). This
equivalence no longer holds in more general multiperiod cases where the certainty equivalent approach
(Fama, 1977) can always be applied but the risk adjusted discount rate requires some assumptions. We
thus follow the certainly-equivalent approach (Fama, 1977) that even though less usual, does not suﬀer
from the criticism addressed to the standard risk adjusted discounting.
4.2 Optimization and equilibrium models
Returning to the reference two stage set up, we assume that the annuities I(k) of plants k have been
computed from the total investment costs I(k) at the risk free rate Rf . We again begin with the
optimization form of the capacity expansion problem where the second stage objective function Q(x, ω)
is given by the short run model (2) to (4). Calling upon the notion of stochastic discount factor the value
in stage 0 of the total random cost incurred in stage 1 can be stated as RfEp[m(ω)Q(x, ω)] where m(ω)
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is the stochastic discount factor. The minimization of the total investment and operations cost can then
be stated as
min
x≥0
∑
k∈K
I(k)x(k) +RfEp[m(ω)Q(x, ω)] (47)
or
min
x≥0
∑
k∈K
I(k)x(k) + Ep[Q(x, ω) +R
fcov[m(ω), Q(x, ω)]. (48)
Recall that the state price m(ω) is exogenous to the problem(as in a CAPM based formulation)
and that the expectation with the price kernel is a linear operator that therefore introduces minimal
complications. The consequence is that the problem stated in the original variables x, y and z retains
the standard form of a convex stochastic optimization problem for which one can write KKT conditions.
Because the deﬁnition of Q(x, ω) remains unchanged, its KKT conditions are also unchanged: they are
restated below for the Fixed Demand Model
0 ≤ x(k)− y(k; `, ω) ⊥ µ(k; `, ω) ≥ 0 (49)
0 ≤
∑
k∈K
y(k; `, ω) + z(`, ω)− d(`, ω) ⊥ pi(`, ω) ≥ 0 (50)
0 ≤ c(k;ω) + µ(k; `, ω)− pi(`, ω) ⊥ y(k; `, ω) ≥ 0 (51)
0 ≤ PC(ω)− pi(`, ω) ⊥ z(`, ω) ≥ 0 (52)
The model is completed by the KKT conditions of the investment optimization problem. These become
(using the abridged notation µ(x, k, ω))
0 ≤ I(K)−RfEp[m(ω)µ(x,K, ω)] ⊥ x(K) ≥ 0. (53)
Because −µ(x,K, ω) is a monotone operator, the expression −Ep[m(ω)µ(x,K, `, ω)] would then also
be a monotone operator (and problem (47) a convex problem in x) if the stochastic discount rate m(ω)
were non negative. This is not guaranteed, for instance for the stochastic discount rate derived from the
CAPM. It can then happen that the optimization problem (47) is unbounded because of those scenarios
ω where m(ω) is negative. From an optimization point of view an unbounded problem does not have any
dual solution. From an equilibrium point of view, −Ep[m(ω)µ(x,K, `, ω)] is no longer monotone and (in
this particular case) (53) has no solution. The origin of the problem is that the commonly used CAPM
method does not necessarily guarantee that all m(ω) are non negative (it does not satisfy the stochastic
dominance property). This is a matter of data on R(M,ω). The occurrence of negative m(ω) is thus
entirely a CAPM matter and is independent of the power problem on hand; this can be checked ex ante.
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Finally note that even though all annual investment costs I(k) are computed from the total investment
cost I(k) (including intermediary ﬁnancial costs during construction) at a common risk free rate, and
the same state price m(ω) applies to all plants, the formulation eﬀectively accounts for the risk exposure
speciﬁc to each plant. The method is thus fully in line with a CAPM based project ﬁnance approach that
values each plant according to its risk exposure. This consistence is achieved through the deterministic
equivalent cash ﬂow.
Ep[m(ω)µ(x, k, ω)] = Ep[µ(x, k, ω)] +R
fcov [m(ω), µ(x, k, ω)] (54)
where cov[m(ω), µ(x, k, ω)] is the plant speciﬁc risk adjustment to the expected gross margin.
5 Non-linear stochastic discount rates and valuation functions
Linear stochastic discount factors price systematic risk but not idiosyncratic risk. The capacity expansion
model discussed in the preceding section is based on linear stochastic discount factors and hence only
prices systematic risk. The equilibrium model therefore complies with economic theories that claim that
idiosyncratic risk can only have zero price at equilibrium and hence can be discarded. It does not ﬁt with
other economic theories that explain that agency costs allow idiosyncratic risk to intervene in decisions.
We assume in this section that agency costs may lead investors to account for idiosyncratic risk in their
decisions. Linear discount factors that only span a subspace of the payoﬀs cannot, by construction, reﬂect
that phenomenon. The modern theory of risk functions allows one to expand the above equilibrium model
by introducing non-linear stochastic discount factors that we here apply to the subspace of the payoﬀs
that are not priced by m(ω). The theory of coherent risk functions originates in Artzner (1999); an
extensive treatment of these functions in optimization is provided in Shapiro et al. (2009). We here insert
coherent risk functions in equilibrium models. Because of the context of our model (focussing more on
positive cash ﬂows than positive losses) we conduct the discussion in terms of both risk and valuation
functions; depending on the context we want to ﬁnd the value of a cash ﬂow or the risk of a cost.
5.1 A primer on coherent risk/valuation functions
Consider a two periods problem where one wants to assess in stage 0 a cash ﬂow X(ω) accruing in
stage 1. A valuation function ρ(X(ω)) gives a value to this cash ﬂow. In order to remain as close as
possible to the above discussion of stochastic discount factors we limit ourselves to coherent valuation
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functions introduced by Artzner et al. (1999) in a context of risk and now extensively developped in the
literature. Coherent risk/valuation functions ρ satisfy four axioms that are recalled in Appendix 4. We
are particularly interested in a representation theorem that states that every coherent valuation function
can be represented as
ρ(X(ω)) = Infm∈MEp[m(ω)×X(ω)]. (55)
whereM is a convex set of probability measures.
The representation theorem implies that a valuation function generates a stochastic discount factor
m(ω) which is the minimant of the above inﬁmum problem. This stochastic discount factor diﬀers from
the one discussed in the preceding section in at least two respects. Because m is a probability measure, it
is non negative. This guarantees the monotonicity property (Axiom 2 in Appendix 4) that is sometimes
violated in stochastic discount factors derived from other theories such as the CAPM. Another major
diﬀerence is that this stochastic discount rate is a function of the payoﬀ X(ω) and hence the valuation
process is a non-linear operator.
We accordingly write ρ(X(ω)) = Ep[m(X,ω) × X(ω)] and note that ρ(X(ω)) is a concave function
of X in the case of the risk adjusted valuation of a payoﬀ (and a convex function for the risk adjusted
valuation of a cost). We also note that one of the axioms deﬁning risk/valuation functions (Axiom 3 in
Appendix 4) immediately implies that the value of a risk free asset 1(ω) that redeems 1 in all states of the
world in stage 1 is equal to 1
Rf
, or in other words ρ(1(ω)) = 1
Rf
. The reader is referred to the original
papers of Artzner et al. (1999) and to the extensive discussion and the many examples of risk functions
(coherent or not) found in Shapiro et al. (2009). All this applies here whether to risk or value functions.
We conclude this brief summary by noting that, because risk/valuation functions give rise to stochastic
discount factors, they also allow one to restate the value of a random cash ﬂow as a deterministic equivalent
where all discounting takes place at the risk free rate. We brieﬂy recall the reasoning developed in the
previous Section 4.1 and adapt it to this non-linear case. We caution however that the multitemporal
discounting with risk/valuation functions raises questions of time consistency of these functions that
are not discussed here (see Artzner et al. (2002) and Shapiro et al. (2009)). In order to justify the
discounting at the risk free rate consider again a three stages set up where one invests in period 0 and
collects the random payoﬀs X1(ω) and X2(ω1, ω2) in stages 1 and 2 respectively. Let m2(X2|ω1, ω2|ω1)
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be the conditional stochastic discount factor derived from the valuation function in stage 2 for given ω1.
As before let p2(ω2|ω1) be the conditional probability of the diﬀerent states of the world in stage 2. The
value in stage 1 of payoﬀ X2(ω2|ω1) conditional on ω1 can be written
Ep2|ω1 [m2(X
2|ω1, ω2|ω1)×X2(ω2|ω1)]
= 1
Rf
[
Ep2|ω1X
2(ω2|ω1) +Rfcov[m2(X2|ω1, ω2|ω1), X2(ω2|ω1)]
]
= 1
Rf
X˜2(ω1)
where X˜2(ω1) is the deterministic equivalent in period 1 of the conditional cash ﬂow X2(ω2|ω1).
Let now p1(ω1) be the probability measure of the diﬀerent states of the world in stage 1. We need to
assess in stage 0 a payoﬀ
X1(ω1) +
1
Rf
X˜2(ω1)
accruing in period 1. Conducting the same reasoning, the valuation in stage 0 of this random cash ﬂow
accruing in stage 1 can be written as
1
Rf
X˜1,2.
As in Section 4.1, one sees that all deterministic equivalent cash ﬂows are discounted at the risk free
rate provided these deterministic equivalents have been computed with the stochastic discount factors
derived from the valuation function. The implication is that the annual investment cost I(k) of a plant k
can be computed from the total investment cost I(k) using the risk free rate. This part of the reasoning
would remain true if we were to account for the question of time consistency alluded to above. But the
multitemporal discounting of the cash-ﬂows would be restricted to time consistent valuation functions.
5.2 Coherent risk/valuation functions and stochastic discount factors
Consider again the decomposition of the payoﬀ space X = Xm + X⊥m where Xm(ω) and X⊥m(ω) are
respectively the systematic and idiosyncratic components of the payoﬀ. Diﬀerent economic theories (e.g.
CAPM, APT, multitemporal consumption model) can be used to construct a stochastic discount rate
m?(ω) that prices the systematic risk while giving a zero value to the idiosyncratic risk. We introduce a
price for the idiosyncratic risk embedded in X(ω) by writing the value of the payoﬀ in stage zero as
ρ(X(ω)) = Ep[m
?(ω)×Xm?(ω)] + Infm∈M⊥m?Ep[m(ω)×X⊥m?(ω)]. (56)
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where m? prices the systematic risk (for instance as speciﬁed in the CAPM) andM⊥m? is a set of prob-
ability measures ofM orthogonal to m? that price the idiosyncratic risk.
This expression requires a decomposition of the payoﬀ into its systematic (priced by m?(ω)) and
idiosyncratic parts (orthogonal to m?(ω)). This is easily obtained by writing X?m(ω) as the projection
of X(ω) on m?, or X(ω) =
cov[X(ω)m∗(ω)]
σ2(m∗(ω))
m∗(ω) + X⊥m∗(ω). The obtained expression X⊥m∗(ω) is
clearly linear in X(ω).
5.3 Optimization model
Consider now the risk adjusted capacity expansion optimization model. This model is expressed in terms
of costs, which justiﬁes our using the risk interpretation of ρ. We thus apply the above risk function to
the second stage cost Q(x, ω) and deﬁne the following convex optimization problem.
min
x≥0
∑
k∈K
I(k)x(k) +Rfρ[Q(x, ω)] (57)
One obtains the KKT conditions of that optimization problem by concatenating the equilibrium
conditions of the short-term problem (18) - (21) with the following risk adjusted investment condition
0 ≤ I(K)−Rf ∂ρ
∂ν(ω)
∂Q(x, ω)
∂x
⊥ x(K) ≥ 0 (58)
Deﬁne the stochastic discount factor φ(x, ω) =
∂ρ(Q(x, ω))
∂ν(ω)
= m?(ω) + m(Q(x, ω)) and recall that
∂Q(x, ω)
∂x(k)
= µ(x, k, ω). The investment criterion is stated as
0 ≤ I(K)−RfEp(φ(x, ω)× µ(x,K, ω)) ⊥ x(K) ≥ 0. (59)
Note that the representation theorem implies that m(Q(x, ω)) is a probability measure. In contrast
m? need not be as the example of the CAPM discussed in the preceding section shows. µ(x;K) =
Ep(φ(x, ω)×µ(x,K, ω)) is a monotone operator when m? is non negative since ρ(X(ω)) is then a coherent
risk function (see Appendix 4).
5.4 Equilibrium models
The above formulation cannot be directly restated in competitive equilibrium terms. Speciﬁcally the de-
pendence of the stochastic discount rate on the total system cost or welfare has a natural interpretation
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for a risk averse monopoly company but it does not apply to agents of a market where the total cost
of the system is the sum of the costs incurred by these agents. We ﬁrst discuss tentative equilibrium
interpretations of condition (58) by invoking diﬀerent assumptions of market structures.
Suppose without loss of generality that the market only comprises a single electricity consumer (noted
c) and the other agents (noted o ∈ O) own generation capacities xo(k), k ∈ K (x(k) = ∑o∈O xo(k), for
all k). Take ﬁrst the Fixed Demand Model; the short run cost optimization model (of section 1.3) in
state of world ω can be restated in dual form as
Q(x, ω) ≡ max
∑
`
τ(`)[pi(`, ω)d(`, ω)−
∑
k
µ(k, `, ω)x(k)] (60)
s.t.
pi(`, ω)− µ(k, `, ω) ≤ c(k, ω) (61)
pi(`, ω) ≤ PC(ω) (62)
pi(`, ω) ≥ 0, µ(k, `, ω) ≥ 0. (63)
The dual objective function is the sum of the total payment for electricity by the consumer Π(ω) =∑
` τ(`)pi(`, ω)d(`, ω) minus the sum over all plants of the gross margins µ(x, k, ω)x
o(k) made by the
owners of the diﬀerent capacities xo(k). The total proﬁt of capacity owner o is then Πo(x, ω) =∑
k µ(x, k, ω)x
o(k).
We write
Q(x, ω) = Π(ω)−
∑
o∈O
Πo(x, ω). (64)
Recalling that the derivative of Q(x, ω) with respect to x(k) is the marginal proﬁt µ(x, k, ω) accruing to
every owner of capacity k in state of the world ω when increasing this capacity, the investment condition
(59) could be associated to an owner o of capacity k if we could ascertain that
∂ρ[Q(x, ω)]
∂ν(ω)
= φ(x, ω) is
the stochastic discount rate of every capacity owner o making a proﬁt
∑
k
µ(x, k, ω)xo(k). It remains to
identify if and when this latter condition can hold.
Consider ﬁrst the case where all capacity owners o have the same generation structure xo, that is
the same portfolio of generation plants (generators are identical up to a scaling factor). Their proﬁts
Π0(x, ω) are then equal for all ω up to the scaling factor. Suppose also that they have the same risk
function. Let φo(Πo(x, ω), ω) be the stochastic discount factor of capacity owner o when it is making a
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proﬁt Πo(x, ω) =
∑
k µ(x, k, ω)x
o(k). Because these generators have the same share of diﬀerent plants,
the positive homogeneity of the coherent risk function ρ (Axiom 4 in Appendix 4) implies they also
have the same stochastic discount factor. Unfortunately, this common value is not necessarily equal to
∂ρ[Q(x, ω)]
∂ν(ω)
because the total cost Q(x, ω) which is the argument of the risk function in (58) contains
the term Π(ω) which is not proportional to Π0(x, ω).
Consider now consumer c. The stochastic discount rate of this consumer is φc(Π(ω), ω), which is equal
to
∂ρ(Π(ω))
∂ν(ω)
. Suppose now that we can arrange for
φo(Πo(x, ω), ω) = φc(Π(ω), ω) ∀ o (65)
then we also have
φo(Πo(x, ω), ω) = φc(Π(ω), ω) =
∂ρ
∂ν(ω)
[Q(x, ω)]. (66)
and (58) would be a true equilibrium model with risk averse consumers and generators having the same
stochastic discount factor.
Financial products can in principle help achieve equality (65) (Ralph and Smeers, 2010) even if gen-
erators are not identical up to a scaling factor. Suppose a market that trades bonds paying coupons
indexed on electricity and fuel prices. The owner of a plant could hedge its revenue by a portfolio of these
bonds. The consumer could also hedge its electricity payment Π(ω) with these bonds. The diﬃculty
of this reasoning is that it does not apply to idiosyncratic risk that, by deﬁnition, cannot be traded.
Stating model (57) as an equilibrium model may thus be an interesting counterfactual but it is only an
approximation that holds if idiosyncratic risk is not too important.
The same reasoning applies to the Variable Demand Model. Total welfare is the sum of consumer and
producer surplus, a relation that we write as
−MSTW (x, ω) = ∑o∈O∑`∈L τ(`)[∑k∈K p(`, ω)− c(k, ω)]yo(k, `, ω)
+[
∫ d(`,ω)
0
p(ξ, `, ω)dξ − p(`, ω) d(`, ω)].
(67)
or MTSW (x, ω) = −∑o Πo(x, ω) − Πc(ω) where Πo(x, ω) and Πc(ω) are respectively generator o and
consumer c surplus. We can therefore interpret the variable demand version of (58) as an equilibrium
model if we can guarantee
φo(Πo(x, ω), ω) = φc(Πc(ω), ω) =
∂ρ
∂ν(ω)
(MSTW (x, ω)). (68)
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Equality will hold for all generators if they have the same generation structure (again up to a scaling
factor). But equality between φo(Πo(x, ω), ω) and φc(Πc(ω), ω) can only hold if consumers and generators
can trade idiosyncratic risk. As before, this is not possible by deﬁnition.
In order to conclude the discussion consider an alternative market structure where each generator
specializes in one technology. The set O of generators o then coincides with the set K of technologies
k. By construction, we can no longer attempt to make the stochastic discount factors of the diﬀerent
generators equal. A ﬁnancial market could still entail that equality if idiosyncratic risk could be traded
between generators and the consumer. But this is again impossible by deﬁnition of the idiosyncratic
risk. In conclusion we can retain model (59) completed by the short run equilibrium conditions (6) to
(9) or its Variable Demand Model counterpart as an ideal counterfactual but need to consider alternative
formulations that better account for the nature of idiosyncratic risk. The following presents diﬀerent
models that one can think of. They are all stated in the Fixed Demand Model form but can easily be
adapted to the Variable Demand Model. The two ﬁrst models have the same short term market submodel
(69) to (72); the third model has a slightly modiﬁed version that will be presented in due course.
0 ≤ x(k)− y(k; `, ω) ⊥ µ(k; `, ω) ≥ 0 (69)
0 ≤
∑
k∈K
y(k; `, ω) + z(`, ω)− d(`, ω) ⊥ pi(`, ω) ≥ 0 (70)
0 ≤ c(k;ω) + µ(k; `, ω)− pi(`, ω) ⊥ y(k; `, ω) ≥ 0 (71)
0 ≤ PC(ω)− pi(`, ω) ⊥ z(`, ω) ≥ 0 (72)
5.4.1 Perfect risk trading or perfectly diversiﬁed plant portfolios
Whatever the shortcomings of the optimization model (57) for representing an equilibrium it remains a
useful counterfactual because it represents an ideal situation of a complete market where idiosyncratic
risk could be traded, for instance through special insurance contracts. Also, because it is a convex
optimization problem, it is easy to compute. Note that it may be unbounded (and hence not amenable to
an equilibrium interpretation) when m∗(ω) has negative components. We simply restate the investment
part (which is similar to the criterion of equation (53) but not with a risk adjustment on welfare instead
of costs) of the model here without further discussion.
0 ≤ I(K)−Rf ∂ρ(Q(x, ω), ω)
∂ν(ω)
∂Q(x, ω)
∂x
⊥ x(K) ≥ 0 (73)
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that is rewriten
0 ≤ I(K)−RfEp(φ(x, ω)× µ(x,K, ω)) ⊥ x(K) ≥ 0. (74)
5.4.2 The project ﬁnance approach
The project ﬁnance approach is a second counterfactual where each plant is valued on the basis of its
own merit. Consider now a market where each agent invests in a particular technology. Let ρk be the
valuation function of agent k. The investment criterion leads to a formulation where each investor k
solves the following proﬁt maximisation problem
min
x(k)≥0
[I(k)−Rfρk[µ(x, k, ω)]]x(k) (75)
where µ(x, k, ω) retains its interpretation of marginal value of a unit capacity of plant k in the short run
equilibrium when the system portfolio is x. The corresponding investment condition for plant of type k
is then
0 ≤ I(k)−RfEpφk(x, ω)µ(x, k, ω) ⊥ x(k) ≥ 0 (76)
where φk(x, ω) = m?(ω) + mk(
∑
`∈L
τ(`)µ(x, k, `, ω), ω). This condition applies to all plants k each one
being written with plant k speciﬁc stochastic discount factor φk (compare with Section 4 where a simple
stochastic discount factor applies to all plants). This problem can easily be converted into a variational
inequality problem if, as is often the case there are constraints on investment possibilities. Each mapping
−Epφk(x, ω)µ(x, k, ω) is monotone ifm?(ω) is non negative. Consider now the global investment criterion
0 ≤ I(K)− F (x) ⊥ x(K) ≥ 0 (77)
where F k(x) = −RfEpφk(x, ω)µ(x, k, ω). Even though each F k(x) is monotone, the mapping F (x) does
not necessarily satisfying this property.
5.4.3 Diversiﬁed portfolio models
We now come back to the model with diﬀerent generators o that each invest in and operate a mix of
generating capacities. For the sake of realism we here complicate the problem and suppose that each
operator has an existing generation ﬂeet xo(k) and is considering investing xo(k). We deﬁne
x(k) =
∑
o∈O
xo(k) (78)
x(k) =
∑
o∈O
xo(k) (79)
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and modify the equilibrium conditions of the short run market in order to account for existing capacities.
These become
0 ≤ x(k) + x(k)− y(k; `, ω) ⊥ µ(k; `, ω) ≥ 0 (80)
0 ≤
∑
k∈K
y(k; `, ω) + z(`, ω)− d(`, ω) ⊥ pi(`, ω) ≥ 0 (81)
0 ≤ c(k;ω) + µ(k; `, ω)− pi(`, ω) ⊥ y(k; `, ω) ≥ 0 (82)
0 ≤ PC(ω)− pi(`, ω) ⊥ z(`, ω) ≥ 0 (83)
The proﬁt of generator o in state of world ω is then
Πo(x+ x;ω) ≡
∑
k
[xo(k) + xo(k)]µ[x(k) + x(k);ω] (84)
The investment criterion needs now be rewritten for each generator o
0 ≤ I(k)−RfEp[φo[Πo(x+ x;ω);ω]µ[x(k) + x(k);ω] ⊥ xo(k) ≥ 0. (85)
This criterion applies to the set of plants and can thus be rewritten as
0 ≤ I(K)− F 0(x) ⊥ x0(K) ≥ 0 (86)
where F 0(x) = RfEp[φ0[pi0(x+ x;ω)µ[x(K) + x(K);ω]. The criterion must be stated for each generator
o. As for the project ﬁnance model, this mapping is not monotone in general. This problem can easily be
converted into a variational inequality problem if, as is often the case there are constraints on investment
possibilities.
5.4.4 Comment
The loss of monotonicity in the project ﬁnance approach and the diversiﬁed portfolio models has an
economic interpretation. It is related to the need to value idiosyncratic risks that by deﬁnition cannot be
traded. This brings us into the domain of incomplete markets. We shall come back to this phenomenon
in further papers.
6 Numerical Illustration
6.1 The set-up
In this section we illustrate the impact of the investment criteria discussed in the main text on a simple
but realistic example that exhibits diﬀerent relevant features. Very much like the rest of the paper, the
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example illustrates a skeleton of real models. We ﬁrst present the data for the deterministic model that
we then extend to a stochastic version. Consider a two stage problem: one invests in diﬀerent types of
capacities in stage 0 and operates them in stage 1. Following Joskow (2007), our benchmark example is a
three technology problem involving coal, combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) and open cycle gas turbine
(OCGT). Each equipment type is characterized by its annual investment and ﬁxed operating costs and a
CO2 emission factor. Because risk premia are endogenous in the stochastic equilibrium model, investment
costs are meant to be annualized from overnight construction costs at the risk free rate (see Table 1).
Coal CCGT OGGT
I: annual capacity and ﬁxed
operating cost (k Euro/Mw)
140 80 60
e: emission t/Mwh 1 .35 .6
Table 1: Fixed annual cost and emission in a three technology world
All costs are assumed linear in capacity or operations levels implying that we neglect economies of
scale in generation. This assumption is common in capacity expansion models. Emission factors for each
plant are in tons of CO2 per MWh. These ﬁgures are stylized views on costs and emission factors found
in the European industry at the time of this writing. They do not correspond to particular projects but
are realistic. The operating costs will be derived from fuel prices.
The deterministic model supposes one fuel price scenario and one scenario for CO2 prices. We assume
a simple price cap throughout the paper. These are shown in Table 2.
The load duration curve is segmented in 6 demand blocks in order to keep the model simple, while
still guaranteeing suﬃcient detail for arriving at meaningful results. Table 3 gives the relevant ﬁgures
and units.
6.2 Introducing risk (Section 1.2)
The deterministic model only involves a single ω ∈ Ω. The stochastic model resorts to three probability
spaces (Load, fuel and CO2) and hence three probability measures. We generate three possible realisations
for each risk factor multiplying the hourly load level, variable operating costs and CO2 prices with the
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Coal CCGT OGGT
c(k): fuel and variable
operating cost ( Euro/Mwh)
25 45 80
CO2: price (Euro/ton) 20
PC: price cap (Euro/Mwh) 300
Table 2: Variable cost, price cap and CO2 price
power level and utilisation
d: MW 86000 83000 80000 60000 40000 20000
τ : duration (1000 hours) .01 .04 .31 4.4 3 1
Table 3: Reference load duration curve and its decomposition in time segments
factors listed in Table 4. Combining the three values we end up with 27 scenarios that are assumed
equally probable.
6.3 Alternative equilibrium models (Section 2): CO2 cap and free allocation
In order to illustrate the ﬂexibility of the equilibrium framework we also consider slightly more complicated
versions of the simple capacity expansion model used throughout the paper where we include a simple
representation of the EU-ETS (Emission (of CO2) Trading Scheme, Ehrenmann and Smeers, 2010).
Assuming then that the CO2 price is determined in a cap and trade system we explicitly model the cap.
Starting from the emissions obtained in the deterministic base case which are found equal to 219mt, we
create 3 scenarios around this ﬁgure by adding/subtracting 10 mt.As before, the three scenarios are equally likely.
We complicate this EU-ETS model and depart from an optimization model (see Ehrenmann and
Smeers, 2010) for a discussion of that extension) by considering the case where free allowances are
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low central high
Load 90% 100% 110%
Fuel 70% 100% 130%
CO2 price 50% 100% 150%
Table 4: Scenario generation
low central high
CO2 cap 209 mt 219 mt 229 mt
Table 5: Scenario generation
granted to investors. These are usually linked to the expected running hours and to a share of expected
emissions covered by free allocation. We use expected running hours of 8000h for Coal, 6000h CCGT and
of 1000h for GT and assume a 20% coverage. The free allocation rule is then: free allocation= expected
running hours x emission rate x coverage.
6.4 Alternative equilibrium models (Section 2): Elastic Demand
We consider two cases of elastic demand. The ﬁrst one is the standard situation where one assumes that
there is no cross price elasticity: demand in one time segment only depends on the price in that time
segment. The demand function is aﬃne and calibrated as follows: we use a reference price equal to the
Long Run Marginal Cost of Coal (LRMC) at 8000h for the two lowest demand blocks, the LRMC of
CCGT at 6000h for the intermediate demand and the LRMC of a GT at 1000h. These are computed at
the fuel and CO2 prices of the deterministic case.
For a given elasticity we calculate the electricity consumption in node i as a function of the price :
Qi = αi − βi(pricei).
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power level and utilisation
d: MW 86000 83000 80000 60000 40000 20000
Reference price 152 152 65.3 65.3 62.5 62.5
Elasticity .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5
Table 6: Reference load and price
We calibrate the coeﬃcients αi and βi by writing
βi =
(elasticity ∗ demandi)
pricei
and
αi = demandi + pricei ∗ βi.
The second case deals with the much more novel situation where one supposes that developments of
the smart grid type allow for cross substitutions between time segments. We modify the demand function
into
Qi = αi −
∑
j
βij(pricej),
which makes demand in some time segment dependent on the electricity price in other time segments.
We set the cross elasticities so that the oﬀ-peak demand increases if peak prices are very high, thereby
reproducing the storage eﬀect intended in smart grid developments.
β61 -0.1
β62 -0.1
β51 -0.1
β52 -0.1
Table 7: Elasticities
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6.5 Systematic risk and linear discount factor (Section 4)
As explained in the text, the pricing of risk correlated to market risk requires inserting information
on market returns in the scenarios. In order to simplify matters we assume that the market return is
highly correlated with electricity consumption, fuel prices and, to a smaller extent with load. The results
together with the impact on the stochastic discount factor are given in Table 8.
6.6 Idiosyncratic risk and nonlinear discount factor (Section 5)
The pricing of idiosyncratic requires a risk function. We use the CVAR, which is now becoming standard
and is quite amenable to computation. We account for risk aversion (in this case a prudent evaluation of
the payoﬀs) by ignoring the highest 5% realizations. In order not to mix eﬀects we run this case without
pricing market risks (setting m?(ω) to zero). All the risk is thus assumed idiosyncratic.
Fuel Load CO2 Market return m(ω)
Low Low Low .55 1.421
Low Low Medium .6 1.380
Low Low High .65 1.338
Low Medium Low 0.95 1.087
Low Medium Medium 1.0 1.045
Low Medium High 1.05 1.003
Low High Low 1.35 0.753
Low High Medium 1.4 0.711
Low High High 1.45 0.669
Medium Low Low 0.65 1.338
Medium Low Medium 0.7 1.296
Medium Low High 0.75 1.254
Medium Medium Low 1.05 1.003
Medium Medium Medium 1.1 0.962
Medium Medium High 1.15 0.920
Medium High Low 1.45 0.669
Medium High Medium 1.5 0.627
Medium High High 1.55 0.585
High Low Low 0.75 1.254
High Low Medium 0.8 1.212
High Low High 0.85 1.171
High Medium Low 1.15 0.920
High Medium Medium 1.2 0.878
High Medium High 1.25 0.836
High High Low 1.55 0.585
High High Medium 1.6 0.543
High High High 1.65 0.502
Table 8: Market return and linear stochastic discount factor
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6.7 Simulation results
The following table summarizes the computational results; we only report the investments in the diﬀerent
types of plants, the total capacity and the shortfall (see Joskow , 2007 and the discussion of the missing
money" for an explanation of the shortfall) and the average baseload price:
Coal CCGT OCGT Total Max Shortfall Average Baseload Price
Deterministic  (Section 1.2) 20000 40000 20000 80000 6000 60.98
Stochastic  (Section 1.3) 20000 46000 6000 72000 22.6 60.70
Elastic demand  (Section 2.1) 20340 40780 0 61120 0 60.89
Elastic Dmand DSM  (Section 2.3) 24120 37690 0 61810 0 60.91
CO2 constraint  (Section 2.3) 27200 38800 6000 72000 22600 59.85
Free Allocation  (Section 2.3.) 28890 43110 0 72000 22600 60.25
Linear discount factor  (Section 4) 12000 54000 6000 72000 22600 61.71
CVAR  (Section 5) 18000 48000 6000 72000 22600 61.16
Table 9: Computational results
The table provides a direct quantiﬁcation of important eﬀects. Moving from a deterministic to a
stochastic environment reinforces the partial load capacities (CCGT). Introducing cross time segment
substitution (moving from Elastic Demand to Elastic Demand with DMS) implies a shift from peak
(OCGT) to base (coal) units. The free allocation of permits (moving from CO2 constraint to Free
Allocation) eﬀectively acts as a strong incentive to investments. Finally the introduction of a CVaR
shifts investments from high upfront capital expenditure (coal) to lower upfront capital expenses. All
these phenomena are expected. The equilibrium model allows one to quantitatively explore them.
7 Conclusion
The optimization capacity expansion models of the regulatory period have not yet found their counter-
part in the restructured electricity markets. We present diﬀerent adaptations of these former optimization
models to the new competitive environment. Our objective is twofold: the model should be interpretable
in terms of market equilibrium in order to ﬁt with the new competition environment; it should also
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account for risk, which is becoming daunting in the industry. We begin with a simple standard two-stage
version of a stochastic optimization capacity expansion model that we immediately convert into a par-
simonious complementarity representation of the investment problem. The discussion then proceed as
follows. Even though we start with an optimization model, we show that the equilibrium formulation can
encompass much more general models that do not derive from an optimization problem; this is important
in a context where demand resources will play an increasing role. This is also important because of
the ﬂurry of new policies aﬀecting the sector and distorting its environment from normal competition
conditions. The rest of the paper deals with diﬀerent treatments of risk encountered in practice. While a
pure risk neutral version of the model is straightforward to construct, things become more diﬃcult if one
wants to account for risk aversion and how it is treated in corporate ﬁnance. CAPM driven evaluations
are common in practice and the philosophy of project ﬁnance requires to value each plant according to its
own risk proﬁle. This is usually done by discounting the cash ﬂows of individual plants at a plant speciﬁc
risk adjusted discount rate. Because the risk exposure of a plant depends on the development of the
generation system, this approach eﬀectively poses a problem of ﬁxed point, a much more complex object
than what is usually envisaged in practice. We bypass this diﬃculty by invoking stochastic discount
factors that we directly embed in the equilibrium models. Discounting then takes place at the risk free
rate, therefore eliminates diﬃculties that occur when diﬀerent plants are aﬀected by diﬀerent discount
rates. The counterpart is the need to compute risk adjusted or deterministic equivalents of cash ﬂows.
We discuss two diﬀerent approaches both based on stochastic discount factors. Linear discount factors
come for standard economic theories like the CAPM, the APT or the multitemporal consumer theory.
They price what is commonly known as systematic risk. They fully accommodate the requirements of
project ﬁnance that each plant should be valued on the basis of its own risk exposure. But they limit this
valuation to the risk priced by the market, something which is often, but not always accepted in practice.
Diﬃculties arise when one insists on accounting for idiosyncratic risk. We do this by resorting to risk
functions that we embed in the equilibrium context. The extension raises interesting questions: while the
insertion of risk functions in a capacity expansion optimization model maintains convexity properties,
this is not so in equilibrium models when we describe idiosyncratic risk by risk functions. The models
can still be written without diﬃculties. But they loose their convexity properties. This paper does not
discuss the interpretation of this loss of convexity but it suggests that it is deep: because idiosyncratic
risk cannot be traded, the market becomes incomplete a phenomenon that is revealed by the loss the
mathematical properties that guarantee existence and uniqueness of solution (here equilibrium). A nu-
merical illustration illustrates the diﬀerent features treated in the paper.
35
Appendix 1
The optimization model as a perfect competition equilibrium model
Suppose a set of generators, and a set of time segments. A perfect competition equilibrium is a vector
of electricity prices (one price per time segment) and a vector of investments (one per type of capacity)
and generation levels (one per type of capacity and time segment), such that investments and operations
maximize generators' proﬁts at prevailing prices and total generation matches demand in each time seg-
ment.
More explicitly in the single stage view of the equilibrium, a perfect competition equilibrium consists
of a set of electricity prices pi(`) and a set in investment and operations levels x(k) and y(k, `), such that
x(k) and y(k, `) maximize the proﬁt of generator of capacity k at prices pi(`) and the sum of the y(k, `)
over all k matches demand d(`) in time segment `.
Alternatively a two stage view of the problem considers a set of investors in generation capacities that
build/buy capacities and lease them (tolling agreement) to a set of operators of generation capacities that
rent these capacities and sell electricity in a set of time segments. In this set up, a perfect competition
equilibrium is a vector of electricity prices (one per time segment), a vector of capacity prices (one per
time segment), a vector of investment levels (one per type of plant), and a vector of operations levels (one
per type of plant and time segment), such that investment levels maximize investors' proﬁts at prevailing
capacity prices and operations levels maximize operators' proﬁts at prevailing electricity and capacity
prices.
More explicitly, in the the operators' model, a perfect competition equilibrium in the second stage
consists of a set of electricity prices pi(`), a set of rental capacity prices µ(k, `), a set of capacities x(k)
of plant k, and a set of operations level y(k, `), such that the operator of technology maximizes its proﬁt
by renting x(k) of capacity k at price µ(k, `) and selling y(k, `) with that capacity at price pi(`) and the
sum of the y(k, `) over all k matches demand d(`) in time segment `. Similarly, in the investor's and
overall models, a perfect competition equilibrium in the ﬁrst stage consists of a set of capacity rental
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prices µ(k, `), a set of investments in capacity x(k) such that x(k) maximizes the proﬁt of investors
in technology k when rental price is µ(k, `). The two stage perfect competition equilibrium is a set of
electricity price pi(`) and rental price µ(k, `), investments x(k) and operations levels y(k, `) that form a
perfect competition equilibrium in both the ﬁrst and second stages.
Proposition : relation between the optimization and the perfect competition
equilibrium problems
The two deﬁnitions of the perfect competition equilibrium are equivalent in the sense that a perfect com-
petition equilibrium of one type is also a perfect competition equilibrium of the other type. The solution
of the optimization problem is a perfect competition equilibrium and conversely.
Proof. Verify that the complementarity conditions of the three problems are identical.
Appendix 2: Properties of µ(x,K)
2.1. µ(x,K) is a subgradient of Q(x)
Rewrite problem (1) as
Q(x) =
∑
`∈L
τ(`)Q(x, `)
where
Q(x, `) = min
y(k,`),z(`)
∑
k∈K
[c(k) y(k, `) + PC z(`)]
s.t. 0 ≤ x(k)− y(k, `) µ(k, `)
0 ≤
∑
k∈K
y(k, `) + z(`)− d(`) pi(`)
0 ≤ y(k, `)
One knows that
µ(K, `) ∈ ∂xQ(x, `)
and hence since
Q(x) =
∑
`∈L
τ(`)Q(x, `)
µ(K) =
∑
`
τ(`)µ(K, `) ∈ ∂Q(x)
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2.2. µ(x;K) is multivalued
Consider a time segment ` and a set of capacities x(k) such that
0 = x(k)− y(k, `) k = 1, · · · , k∗
0 = y(k, `) k > k∗∑
k y(k, `) = d(`).
One can check that
pi(`) = c(k∗ − 1)
µ(k, `) = pi(`)− c(k) k ≤ k∗ − 1
µ(k, `) = 0 k ≥ k∗
is a vector of dual variables satisfying the short term model. Alternatively, one also veriﬁes that
pi(`) = c(k∗)
µ(k, `) = pi(`)− c(k) k ≤ k∗
µ(k, `) = 0 k > k∗
is also a vector of dual variables satisfying the short term model.
2.3. µ(x,K) is a gradient of MSTW(x, ω)
Rewrite problem (24) to (27)
MSTW(x, ω) =
∑
`∈L
τ(`) MSTW(x, ω, `)
where
MSTW(x, ω, `) = min
y(k,`)
[∑
k∈K
c(k, ω) y(k, `, ω)−
∫ d(`,ω)
0
p(ξ, `, ω)dξ
]
s.t. 0 ≤ x(k)− y(k, `, ω) µ(k, `)
0 ≤
∑
k∈K
y(k, `, ω)− d(`, ω) pi(`)
0 ≤ y(k, `, ω).
The function is diﬀerentiable for any point x(K) where the short term complementarity conditions are
strict, that is such that 0 = x(k)− y(k, `) implies y(k + 1, `) > 0. Consider a point where this condition
is not satisﬁed, that is,
y(k∗, `, ω) = 0 < x(k∗)
0 < y(k∗ − 1, `, ω) = x(k∗ − 1).
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Because d(`, ω) > 0 one has
pi(`, ω) = p(d(`, ω)
which is uniquely determined and hence
µ(k∗ − 1, `, ω) = pi(`, ω)− c(k∗ − 1, ω)
is also uniquely determined.
Last, µ(k∗, `, ω) = 0 since
x(k∗)− y(k∗, `, ω) > 0.
The subdiﬀerential boils down to a single point. Because the subdiﬀerential is upper semicontinuous, this
implies that it is continuous.
Appendix 3: Deﬁnition of monotonicity
Let µ(x) be a mapping from Rn into Rn. µ(x) is monotone if
[µ(x)− µ(y)]T (x− y) ≥ 0 for all x and y.
The deﬁnition extends to point to set mapping as follows. Let µ(x) be a point to set mapping from Rn
to Rn. µ(x) is monotone if for any x, y, there exists
µx ∈ µ(x); µy ∈ µ(y)
such that
(µx − µy)T (x− y) ≥ 0.
Appendix 4: Deﬁnition of coherent risk function
The following deﬁnitions are taken from Shapiro et al. (2009).
• A. Let Z be a linear space of random outcome Z(ω). ρ(Z) satisﬁes the following axioms.
• A1. Convexity. ρ(tZ + (1− t)Z ′) ≤ tρ(Z) + (1− t)ρ(Z ′) for all t ∈ [0, 1] and all Z,Z ′ ∈ Z
• A2. Monotonicity. If Z,Z ′ ∈ Z and Z ≥ Z ′ the ρ(Z) ≥ ρ(Z ′).
• A3. Translation equivariance if a ∈ R and Z ∈ Z then ρ(Z + a) = ρ(Z) + a
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• A4. Positive homogeneity. If t > 0 and Z ∈ Z then ρ(tZ) = tρ(Z).
The move from a risk function to a valuation function obtains by replacing the convexity axiom A1 by a
concavity axiom A'1.
• A'1. Concavity. ρ(tZ + (1− t)Z ′) ≥ tρ(Z) + (1− t)ρ(Z ′) for all t ∈ [0, 1] and all Z,Z ′ ∈ Z.
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